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B Y THEODORE

J. ST. ANTOINE

These remarks were delivered as the keynote
address for the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service's Third Biennial Midwest
Arbitration Symposium at Minneapolis,
April 12, 1996. Most reference citations have
been deleted. For a copy of this article with
full citations please contact the LQN editor.

A strong new ideological
current is sweeping through
much of the Western World. At
one extreme it manifests itself
as a deep distrust of big
government. In more modest
form, it is a sense of skepticism
or disillusionment about the
capacity of big government to
deal effectively with the
problems confronting our
society. In continental Europe
today there is much talk of the
principle of "subsidiarity," the
notion that social and economic
ills should be treated at the
lowest level feasible, usually the
level closest to the people
directly affected. In the United
States there is much talk of
"privatization," the transfer or
subcontracting of many
traditional governmental
functions to private industry.
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These ideas have their
counterpart in our own field of
labor and employment law. In
some respects there is nothing
new about all this. In the earlier
part of this century labor
unions, bruised as they were by
many encounters with a strikestopping, injunction-wielding
judiciary, looked upon law and
government as more foe than
friend. Unions responded
warmly to the laissez-faire
philosophy embodied in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act of the
early 1930s. Management as
well as labor came to regard
government involvement as
intrusive; both espoused the
private settlement of unionemployer disputes through
collective bargaining and
voluntary arbitration. Even
when the federal government
began to intervene more
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actively, through the Wagner
and Taft-Hartley acts, Congress
directed the newly reorganized
Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service to "make its
... services available in the
settlement of ... grievance
disputes only as a last resort
and in exceptional cases."
Indeed, so ardent a champion of
collective bargaining and
grievance arbitration as Dean
Harry Shulman decried the very
concept of court litigation over
labor agreements.
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In the mid-1960s and continuing
thereafter, the preeminence of collective
bargaining in the governance of the
American workplace began to erode. Certain
ancient problems, like race and gender
discrimination, workplace safety, and
pension and benefit guarantees, proved
intractable. At the same time union density
and bargaining power were declining.
Government had to step in. And it did so
through the whole series of laws with which
we have become so familiar - the Equal
Pay Act (EPA), Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and all the rest. To
add to the onslaught of governmental
regulation, some 45 states during the 1980s
seized upon one legal theory or another to
ameliorate the worst rigors of the traditional
American doctrine of employment at will.
Then came the counterrevolution. The
taxpayers rebelled, Newt Gingrich rode into
Washington, and the underfunded federal
and state judiciaries and administrative
agencies began to buckle under the
avalanche of employee complaints.
The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alone was receiving about
100,000 charges of discrimination a year
and its backlog soared past that figure .
Employers, dismayed by seven-figure jury
verdicts in wrongful discharge actions and
the $100,000 costs of even a successful
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META
defense, began increasingly to seek private
means of settling disputes with their
workers. And Congress, in both the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, expressly
encouraged alternative methods of
resolving discrimination disputes "where
appropriate and to the extent authorized
by law." That is where we are today. Once
more the tide is turning, this time away
from formal governmental procedures and
back toward such private, relatively
informal processes as mediation and
arbitration.

The courts and arbitration
Initially, the courts had been rather
unreceptive to arbitrators' handling of
employment discrimination cases. Thus, in
Alexanderv. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) the
Supreme Court held that an arbitral award
finding 'just cause" for a termination under
a collective bargaining agreement did not
prevent the discharged employee from
seeking a de nova trial in federal court of his
claim of racial discrimination in violation
of Title VII. The stated rationale was that
the arbitrator only applied the contract, not
the statute, and that Title VII supplements
and does not supplant other rights, leaving
the employee free to pursue both claims.
The Court seemed untroubled by Spielberg
Mfg. Co. (1955), under which the National
Labor Relations Board will "recognize" or
"honor" an arbitral award in an unfair labor
practice case, as long as certain safeguards
are met, even though there too the
arbitrator is technically only dealing with
contract rights and the Board is dealing
with the employee's statutory right under
the National Labor Relations Act to be free
of antiunion discrimination or coercion.
Even under Alexander, however, the Court
acknowledged in the now-famous footnote
21 that the arbitral award could be
admitted in the court suit and could be
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accorded "great weight" if supported by an
adequate record.
A much more receptive attitude toward
arbitration was exhibited by the Supreme
Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp. (1991). A 7-2 majority ruled that an
individual employee of a brokerage firm
who was subject to a Stock Exchange rule
requiring arbitration of all employment
disputes could not sue directly on an age
discrimination claim under ADEA, but
could be ordered to arbitrate instead.
The majority emphasized that th:e Federal
Arbitration Act favors arbitration.
Alexander was distinguished on the
grounds the arbitrator there was only
authorized to apply the contract, while
the Stock Exchange rules empowered
arbitrators to resolve statutory claims as
well. Technically, the holding in Gilmer
could be treated as just an exhaustion-ofremedies requirement, a requirement that
one go to arbitration before seeking a
judicial remedy, but the language of the
opinion is much broader in its endorsement
of arbitration and the finality of arbitration.
The Court stressed that the broker was not
losing a statutory right; he was merely
being required to use a different forum for
the enforcement of that right. As a practical
matter, the Court was also affected by the
fact that the employee in Gilmer executed
the arbitration agreement himself,
while Alexander involved "collective
representation" and the possible conflicts
that might present.
In my opinion, Alexander should be
modified and Gilmer extended to authorize
the final and binding arbitration of
statutory claims when that is provided for
in either a collective bargaining agreement
or an individual employee-employer
contract. There would of course be need,
especially in the individual case, for close
scrutiny to prevent any possible coercion,
surprise, or other overreaching by a more
powerful employer. There would also have
to be procedural safeguards, as I shall
discuss shortly, to ensure the fairness and
integrity of the process.

My views on the desirabilty of an
increasing resort to private arbitration for
the resolution of statutory disputes,
including civil rights issues, find support in
the words of such distinguished federal
appellate judges as Alvin Rubin of the Fifth
Circuit, Betty Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit,
and Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit.
Judge Rubin suggested that "some
problems can best be resolved by giving a
wider hand to collective bargaining and to
resolution of disputes in arbitration." Even
more pointedly, Judge Fletcher declared
that "arbitration . . . is the best forum for
the grievant. ... [A] rbitrators have it within
their power and their grasp to improve the
process in order to accomplish the goals of
Title VII."
Perhaps most noteworthy of all are the
observations of Judge Harry Edwards,
because he was an active practitioner in
labor law and an eminent labor scholar at
both Michigan and Harvard before
ascending the bench, and because he
formerly expressed "grave reservations
about arbitrators deciding public law
issues." On the basis of his experience on
the court, Judge Edwards changed his
mind. Said he: "I believe that arbitration
should be explored as a mechanism for the
resolution of individual claims of
discrimination in unorganized, as well as
unionized, sectors of the employment
market." Like Judges Rubin and Fletcher,
Judge Edwards stressed the speed and cost
savings of arbitration as advantages over
litigation in the resolving of disputes. The
greater informality of arbitration can also
be conducive to a lessening of employeremployee hostility, which is especially
desirable in the event reinstatement is
ultimately ordered.

Guaranteeing due process
If private procedures like arbitration,
agreed to by the employer and the
employee, are to supersede the
administrative or judicial procedures
prescribed by a statute, there should be
guarantees that customary "due process"
standards are applicable. Two prestigious
groups have recently set forth their
precriptions for the required procedural
safeguards. Those were the Dunlop
Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations and a task force
convened by the American Bar Association,
consisting of representatives of the ABA
Labor and Employment Law Section, the
American Arbitration Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, the National Academy of
Arbitrators, the National Employment
Lawyers Association, and the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution.
The Dunlop Commission strongly
recommended the development of private
arbitration procedures for handling
workplace disputes, including statutory
issues. To ensure that the public law rights
of individual employees would not be
jeopardized, the Commission proposed
several "quality standards":
1. a neutral arbitrator who knows the
law, jointly selected by the parties;
2. fair and simple procedures, including
discovery;
3. cost-sharing to help ensure arbitral
impartiality;
4. independent representation if the
employee wants it;
5. remedies equal to those provided by
statutue;
6. a written arbitral opinion giving the
rationale; and
7. judicial review to ensure compliance
with governing law, but limited with
respect to the arbitrator's findings of fact.
The ABA-convened task force,
composed of persons from highly diverse
organizations, did not reach consensus on

a number of issues, although in some
respects its recommendations were even
more detailed than the Dunlop
Commission's, with special emphasis on
the need for the training of arbitrators
about statutory law. In any event, the
major standards for due process contained
in the task force's "protocol" closely
paralleled the Commission's:
1. an impartial arbitrator with
knowledge of the statutory issues at stake,
jointly selected by the parties;
2. adequate but limited pre-hearing
discovery;
3. cost-sharing to help ensure arbitral
impartiality;
4. the right to representation by a
person of the employee's own choosing;
5. whatever relief would be available
under the law;
6. an opinion and an award, including a
statement of the issues resolved and the
statutory claims disposed of; and
7. a final and binding award subject to
limited review.

Arbitration: A condition
of employment?
There is one important issue on which
the Dunlop Commission takes a stand, and
which the Task Force sidesteps. May an
employer make an employee's agreeing to
arbitration a condition of employment7
The Commission flatly says "No," at least
not "at this time. " The Commission
declares that "any choice between available
methods for enforcing statutory
employment rights should be left to the
individual who feels wronged rather than
dictated by his or her employment
contract." Although it does not say this in
so many words, the Commission would
apparently allow an employee to contract
for binding arbitration only after a dispute
has arisen. At least in a discharge case, the
employee would then have little or nothing
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The result of this sophisticated
scheme is a sensible tradeoff.
Employees are guaranteed
certain irreducible substantive
rights. In return employers are
relieved of the risk of crushing
legal liability. Both sides~
are provided procedures
that should be simpler,
faster, and cheaper
than the cunent jury
system.

~

66

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

to lose if he or she offends the employer by
refusing to agree to arbitration. I detect a
hint of ambivalence within the
Commission on this issue, however; it goes
on to remark that if private arbitration
systems prove themselves in enforcing
public rights, then the nation could decide
"whether employers should be allowed to
require their employees to use them as a
condition of employment."
The Task Force reflected its hybrid
composition in announcing that it "takes
no position on the timing of agreements to
arbitrate statutory employment disputes,
though it agrees that such agreements be
knowingly made" (emphasis supplied). The
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, in a policy statement of July
1995 concerning alternative dispute
programs to be developed under
Commission auspices, insisted that "parties
must knowingly, willingly and voluntarily
enter into an ADR proceeding" (emphasis
supplied). Moreover, the Commission
would permit an employee to opt out of a
proceeding at any time before its resolution
and to go ahead and file a lawsuit instead.
I don't think this issue is as easy as it
may seem to some. We can start with the
comfortable premise that no employee
should have to give up a statutory right to
a particular forum as the price for a job.
But there is respectable employer
testimony that businesses will often be
unwilling to agree to arbitration after a
dispute has arisen. At that point in a
particular case they may have more to gain
by just sitting back and awaiting the
lawsuit that in many instances will never
materialize.
Thus, as a practical matter, the real
choice may be between allowing the
employee to agree to arbitration in
advance, as Mr. Gilmer did, or greatly
diminishing the likelihood that arbitration
will ever be used. What does the employee
actually lose if required to arbitrate?
Statutory forums and jury trial rights
sound all very fine in theory, but what
good are they if the EEOC is so burdened
by a case backlog that it must resort to

triage, as it now does with its "A," "B," and
"C' classifications of cases, tossing out
many charges wholesale after the briefest of
investigations? And what good are the
statutory rights if the courts are so far
behind schedule that the employee must
wait three or four years for an enforceable
judgment? It seems to me at least arguable
that many employees would be much
better off with arbitration, even as a
condition of employment, as long as there
was guaranteed the type of procedural
safeguards called for by the Dunlop
Commission and the ABA-convened task
force. At any rate, I think this is a question
that deserves to be fully debated, with less
emphasis on abstract theory and more on
pragmatic considerations of the sort I have
described. So far, incidentally, a court of
appeals has simply held that an employee
must "knowingly" agree to arbitrate a
Title VII claim before forgoing statutory
procedures. At most a "knowing"
agreement is all I can see in the Supreme
Court's Gilmer case.

Deferring to arbitration
The birthpains we are witnessing as the
courts and the agencies seek a viable
system of arbitrating statutory civil rights
claims had earlier parallels in the judicial
and administrative treatment of other
statutory disputes. As I mentioned
previously, the National Labor Relations
Board, in its Spielberg/Olin line of cases
(1955 and 1984), held that it would
"honor" or "defer to" an arbitral award in a
subsequent unfair labor practice case if
certain standards had been met. The
arbitration proceedings had to be fair and
regular; all parties had to agree to be
bound; the decision must not have been
"clearly repugnant" to the policies of the
act; the contract issue before the arbitrator
had to be "factually parallel" to the unfair
labor practice issue before the board; and
the arbitrator had to be "presented
generally" with the facts relevant to

resolving the ULP issue. In Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court
explicitly declined to apply the Spielberg
doctrine to Title VII cases, but it did not
question the validity of Spielberg in the
NLRA context.
Later, and more controversially, the
NLRB extended the deferral doctrine to
situations where the ULP charge had been
filed before there was any arbitral award.
In Collyer Insulated Wire (1971), the board
held that it would defer to the arbitration
procedure in those cirumstances also,
provided the employer's action being
challenged did not undermine the union,
the employer's action was based on a
"substantial claim" under the contract, and
the arbitral interpretation of the contract
would likely resolve the ULP issue as well.
Collyer itself involved a charge against an
employer for allegedly refusing to bargain
by taking certain unilateral action in
violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. Subsequently, and still more
controversially, the board extended the
Collyer doctrine to individual cases of
alleged discrimination. While Collyer dealt
with contract issues that might seem
peculiarly appropriate for arbitral
resolution, United Technologies dealt with
an individual's statutory rights against
antiunion discrimination, which some
might deem as sensitive as the civil rights
at stake in Alexander and Gilmer. Yet the
courts have generally gone along.
Finally, I should mention Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. (1981). There the
Supreme Court held, in a 7-2 decision, that
employees were not barred from suing on
wage claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act by an adverse arbitration
award under the collective bargaining
agreement. The majority reasoned that
statutory rights under the FLSA, like Title
VII rights, are individual rights, not
collective rights, and are not waivable by a
union. Putting Alexander, Barrentine, and
Gilmer together, it does appear that the
Supreme Court may give individual
employees greater power to waive statutory

rights and commit to binding arbitration
than is accorded their union representatives
under collective bargaining agreements.
That makes sense if one is skeptical about a
union's capabilities and zeal in
safeguarding the rights of the employees it
represents; it makes far less sense if one
focuses on the relative bargaining power of
employers, unions, and individual workers.
In addition to the whole range of statutory
rights which now seems to be opening up
as a new arbitral domain, there is another
large area looming on the horizon which
may become a fertile source of arbitration
practice. It is a further example of the
widespread trend in society, of which I
spoke at the outset, to seek solutions for its
problems outside the formalized processes
of government. Beginning in the 1960s,
and accelerating rapidly during the 1980s,
there was a movement in the state courts of
some 45 jurisdictions to modify the once
universal principle of employment at will.
As bluntly expressed by one nineteenth
century American court, that meant
employers could "dismiss their employees
at will .. . for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong." Workers
could be fired for refusing to engage in
illegal price fixing or even for refusing to
commit perjury at the behest of the
employer.

Benefitting both employers
and employees
At-will employment remains a
substantial problem today. Professor jack
Stieber of Michigan State University
calculates that there are roughly 60 million
at-will employees in the United States, of
whom about two million are fired annually.
Of these, Stieber believes 150,000 or more
would have valid causes of action if they
had the same "just cause" rights afforded
nearly all the union workers under
collective bargaining agreements.
The state courts have used three
principal theories to modify employment at
will. Each has serious deficiencies for

employees and employers alike. The first is
the public policy exception. But that takes
an egregious violation, such as discharging
an employee for refusing to commit a
crime. Relatively few employees will find
that modification useful.
Second is the contract exception.
An employer may be held liable for an
arbitrary dismissal if it has included a
guarantee of no discipline except for good
cause in an employee handbook. But an
employer can avoid that restriction by
simply refraining from any such
assurances, or even by excising any
existing protections from personnel
manuals with adequate advance notice.
The third and potentially most
expansive theory, the notion that every
contract contains an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that forbids an
unjust discharge, has doctrinal infirmities
and has been accepted by only a handful
of states.
Finally, the employees who win in court
are rarely rank-and-file workers. Only
professional and managerial employees are
likely to have large enough claims to attract
the attention of lawyers operating on the
basis of contingent fees.
On the other hand, when an employer
becomes enmeshed in a common-law
wrongful discharge action, the results can
be a heavy financial blow. Several studies
of California cases showed that a plaintiff
employee who can get to a jury will win
about 75 percent of the time, with the
average award around $450,000.
Multimillion dollar verdicts for single
individuals are not uncommon across
the country.
Even the successful defense of a jury
case may cost $100,000 to $200,000. And
two years ago a RAND study estimated that
the "hidden costs" of the common-law
regime - for example, keeping on
inefficient employees out of a fear of
expensive lawsuits - amount to 100 times
as much as the court judgments and other
legal expenses.
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Alternative dispute resolution
procedures are needed for the benefit of
everyone, employers as well as employees.
In August 1991 the prestigious National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State laws adopted, by the resounding
vote of 39 state delegations to 11, the
Model Employment Termination Act
(META). META prohibits the dismissal of
most full-time employees after one year of
service unless there is "good cause." The
preferred method of enforcing META is
through the use of professional arbitrators.
The remedies are similar to those under the
NLRA, the original Title VII, and the usual
labor contract, namely, reinstatement
with or without back pay. General
compensatory and punitive damages are
expressly excluded.
The result of this sophisticated scheme
is a sensible tradeoff. Employees are
guaranteed certain irreducible substantive
rights. In return employers are relieved of
the risk of crushing legal liability. Both
sides are provided procedures that should
be simpler, faster, and cheaper than the
current jury system.
META has been introduced in over a
dozen state legislatures. Despite its
overwhelming endorsement by the
Uniform law Commissioners, however, its
prospects for early enactment anywhere are
bleak in the current political climate.
In the longer term, I have high hopes. The
United States is the last major industrial
democracy in the world without legal
protections for workers' jobs, and I cannot
believe we shall remain such an outcast
indefinitely. When we do see the light some time in the next millenium - it will
mean, directly or indirectly, a dramatic
expansion in arbitration practice. The most
thorough study to date found that in the
mid-80s arbitrators were handling
approximately 65,000 union grievances in
a year. With less than 15 percent of the
American work force currently organized,
one could anticipate at least a four- or fivefold increase in employee coverage if laws
like META became universal. Even if we
assume that only a third or so of the
existing arbitration caseload consists of the
kind of discharge or disciplinary issues that
would be subject to legislative protections,
the result could still be some 100,000 new
arbitration cases annually.
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In the meantime, many employers
across the country, deeply disturbed by the
large jury verdicts returned in wrongful
discharge actions, have instituted their own
private programs for the arbitration of
disputes with their employees. In some
respects this development is highly
salutary; at least it may recognize some
modification in at-will employment and
the existence of some worker rights in their
jobs. But in other respects it can be a cause
for concern. Employers, for example, may
exercise excessive control over the choice
of the arbitrator. Subconsciously, arbitrators
may be influenced, or they may be
perceived to be influenced, by the fact the
employer is a "repeat player" in unilaterally
established plans and the one often paying
the bill. Some arbitrators may be deterred
from participating in these plans because of
fear they may be used as union-avoidance
devices. For all these reasons employerpromulgated arbitration systems call for
special scrutiny and the erection of dueprocess safeguards to ensure the fair
treatment of employees. Yet on balance,
with appropriate shields in place, I
consider them better than nothing. Some
employees who are unfairly fired will get
their jobs back, and I think that is worth
the extra trouble on the part of arbitrators
operating under these novel arrangements.
In 1986 arbitrators handled about 2000
non-union grievances during the year about 3 percent of the total.

then than I am now, I had the temerity to
take issue with David on the ending of the
golden age . Today I have a better sense of
what David was driving at. There was a
purity, an appealing simplicity about
arbitration in the two or three decades
following World War II, when unions and
employers were pretty much unchallenged
lords of their own process. Ours is a much
more untidy world, where arbitrators must
often look over their shoulders to see
whether their work is squaring with the
dictates of "the law." Yet I still do not feel
quite the same sense of loss as Professor
Feller. There are golden ages and there are
golden ages. Simplicity has its attractions;
so does complexity. In David Feller's
cherised era, private parties ruled both the
substance and the procedure of
employment regulation. Then government
took over a large swath of the two areas.
Today private parties are regaining a
significant share of the procedure, but
substantive legal regulation remains intact.
Arbitrating in this complex new milieu
should be seen as an exciting challenge
rather than as a dispiriting letdown. As I
said twenty years ago, if it is true in any
sense that we have lost a golden age of
arbitration, it may just be akin to leaving
behind the simple nobility of ancient
Greece, and moving on to the sophisticated
glories of the High Renaissance.
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Court-sponsored arbitration
A final phenomenon of recent times,
and a final example of the "privatization"
that has been an underlying theme of this
paper, is the referral of employer-employee
disputes to an arbitrator by a court. I do
not know how widespread this practice is,
or how much jawboning by a judge it takes
to get the parties to go along. But it
represents one more way in which the
venerable instrument of union-management
arbitration is undergoing transformation to
meet a new set of needs in society.
Two decades ago that peerless labor
lawyer and scholar, David Feller, spoke
poignantly of the passing of what he called
the "golden age of arbitration." By that he
meant a time when the parties' system was
essentially autonomous, concerned
primarily with contract self-enforcement,
and unsullied by a preoccupation with
external law. Being somewhat younger
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